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LSE	Continental	Breakfast	8:	‘follow’,	‘unfriend’	or
‘take	a	break’?	Three	Brexit	scenarios	envisaged
‘Follow’,	‘unfriend’	or	‘take	a	break’?	Reporting	on	LSE	Continental	Breakfast
discussions	held	under	Chatham	House	rules	among	Italian	and	British
economists,	policy-makers	and	the	public	in	Rome	in	early	February
2018,	Marina	Cino	Pagliarello	(LSE)	looks	at	the	economic	and	political
consequences	of	the	three	options	still	open	to	the	UK.	She	then	outlines	the
possibility	of	a	Brexit	that	is	‘lost	in	transition’	due	to	the	apparently	irreconcilable
demands	on	each	side.
The	clock	is	ticking	down.	Almost	two	years	after	the	referendum,	the	whole
Brexit	process	is	at	risk	of	remaining	an	empty	box.	Even	though	the	severe	and
sudden	negative	effects	anticipated	by	the	so-called		‘project	fear’	did	not
materialise,	there	is	considerable	uncertainty	around	the	long-term
consequences.	Theresa	May’s	government	faces	several	unresolved	political
constraints	likely	to	determine	the	shape	of	any	final	agreement.	Three	potential
outcomes	are	in	play:
(i)	the	UK	following	a,	more	or	less,	flexible	EU-oriented	agreement	model;
(ii)	an	‘unfriend’	situation,	with	a	consequent	WTO	agreement	model;
(iii)	‘take	a	break’,	namely	postponing	the	agreement,	which	might	have	important	implications	for	the	survival	of	the
government	itself.
Indeed,	one	thing	is	clear:	a	successful	and	speedy	Brexit	delivery	is	crucial	for	Theresa	May’s	political	survival.
Short-term	economic	consequences	of	Brexit
What	happened	to	the	UK	economy	after	the	referendum?	Even	though	the	economic	outlook	appears	less	severe
than	originally	forecast	by	the	Treasury,	with	current	low	unemployment	rates,	and	net	exports	benefiting	from	the
global	recovery	and	the	lower	pound,	several	worries	and	vulnerabilities	are	accumulating.
To	begin	with,	UK	productivity	growth	is	continuing	to	slow	down;	the	growth	rate	has	fallen	since	the	first	quarter	of
2017	and	UK	is	lagging	behind	major	EU	economies,	such	as	Germany	and	France.		This	stagnation	is	exacerbated
by	low	business	investment,	due	to	the	uncertain	outcome	of	the	negotiations.	One	of	the	most	visible	short	term
effects	of	Brexit	is	banks	and	other	financial	services	beginning	to	relocate	staff,	with	Dublin	and	Frankfurt	competing
for	them.		The	stock	market	has	also	underperformed,	with	an	estimated	drop	in	value	of	UK-oriented	firms	listed	on
the	London	Stock	Exchange	of	about	20-25%	and	a	clear	divergence	between	companies	oriented	to	the	UK	and
those	with	an	international	base.	In	this	respect,	regional	disparities	are	also	growing,	with	London	by	far	the	most
productive	area	in	the	UK.	According	to	the	“Preparing	for	Brexit”	study	commissioned	by	the	Mayor	of	London	from
Cambridge	Econometrics,	this	trend	is	expected	to	continue	whatever	the	eventual	exit	scenario.
At	the	same	time,	the	fall	in	the	exchange	rate	has	added	more	pressures	to	household	consumption,	as	they	suffer
decline	in	their	spending	power	that	might	also	decrease	their	savings.	According	to	the	Financial	Times’	Annual
Survey	of	economists,	the	majority	believe	that	there	will	be	little	or	no	improvement	in	UK	productivity	for	2018	and
the	Economic	Policy	Uncertainty	Index	–	measured	through	the	share	of	articles	in	the	FT	and	Times	discussing	key
words	‘economics’,	‘policy’,	and	‘uncertainty’	–	estimated	that	Brexit	raised	UK	Economic	Policy	Uncertainty	of	200
points	on	average.	This	is	a	significant	figure,	especially	considering	that	the	Great	Recession	raised	the	Economic
Policy	Uncertainty	by	100	points.
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In	the	long	term,	the	economic	outcomes	are	much	more	uncertain	and	depend	on	the	post-exit	trade	models	and	on
what	kind	of	economic	policies	will	be	adopted	by	the	UK	government	after	the	end	of	the	transition	period	in	2020.	In
this	respect,	one	thing	is	clear,	given	that	the	EU	is	the	biggest	UK	trade	partner,	any	reduction	of	trade	will	surely
lower	UK	living	standards.
‘Follow’	–	or	soft	Brexit
Under	a	‘follow’	scenario,	with	the	UK	joining	a	free	trade	area	with	the	EU,	similar	to	Norway	(hence	enjoying	full
access	to	the	Single	Market	with	no	tariffs	on	trade	but	without	being	a	member	of	the	customs	union),	reduced	trade
will	lower	productivity	and	increase	the	costs	of	Brexit	to	a	loss	of	6.3%	of	GDP,	about	£4,200	per	household	per
year.	Indeed,	according	to	LSE	Centre	for	Economic	Performance	predictions,	in	this	scenario	the	average	UK
income	is	estimated	to	fall	by	1.3%	corresponding	to	a	reduction	of	£850	per	household.	Regarding	non-tariff
barriers,	intra-EU	trade	costs	are	estimated	to	fall	20%	faster	than	among	other	OECD	countries,	with	a	consequent
fall	in	the	cost	of	non-tariff	barriers	within	the	EU	of	5.7%	in	the	next	ten	years.	Meanwhile,	the	current	UK	budget
contribution	to	the	EU	according	to	HM	Treasury	(2013)	is	around	0.53%	of	GDP.	Under	a	scenario	in	which	the	UK
remains	in	the	EEA,	the	UK	contribution	will	fall	by	17%,	corresponding	to	0.09%	of	national	income.
However,	a	‘follow’	scenario	could	be	politically	toxic	for	the	UK,	as	it	would	mean	losing	control	of	highly	sensitive
areas	such	as	migration	while	simultaneously	accepting	all	the	regulatory	obligations	(as	Norway	does)	designed	to
reduce	non-tariff	barriers	within	the	Single	Market,	without	any	say	in	their	design.	An	alternative	would	be	the
adoption	of	a	Swiss	model,	with	the	UK	not	being	in	the	EEA	–	and	hence	without	free	trade	in	services	–		but
negotiating	bilateral	agreements	with	the	EU	while	adopting	all	the	regulations	covering	those	parts	of	the	Single
Market	in	which	it	participates.	However,	a	Swiss	solution	would	ultimately	be	detrimental	to	the	UK	economy,	given
its	comparative	advantage	in	the	financial	services	sector.	Additionally,	the	Swiss	model	is	also	a	rather	conflictual
one	due	to	various	political	sovereignty	issues.
‘Unfriend’	–	or	hard	Brexit
	Another	post-exit	model	would	be	to	default	to	WTO	trading	rules,	without	the	UK	negotiating	a	new	trade
relationship	with	the	EU	and	trading	according	to	the	WTO	‘most	favoured	nation’	(MFN)	system.	In	this	respect,
there	is	little	doubt	that	the	greater	the	obstacles	to	EU	market	access,	the	larger	the	projected	losses	and	higher
trade	costs	to	the	UK	economy	will	be,	with	the	emergence	of	several	costs	such	as	custom	clearance,	border
checks	and	rules	of	origin	costs.	Current	predictions	estimate	the	costs	of	this	form	of	Brexit	to	a	loss	of	9.5%	of	GDP
in	the	long-run,	with	a	lowering	of	household	incomes	by	2.6%,	corresponding	to	an	average	of	£1,700	per
household.	High-value	manufacturing	export	sectors	(for	example	pharmaceuticals,	cars	and	chemicals)	would	be
those	the	most	exposed	to	economic	losses.
Under	this	scenario	the	UK	would	be	excluded	from	future	EU	trade	deals,	such	as	the	proposed	EU-US
Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	(TTIP)	and	the	economic	partnership	with	Japan,	that	have	been
estimated	to	lower	prices	by	0.4%	through	the	US	agreement	and	0.2%	in	the	case	of	the	Japanese	one.	Outside	the
Single	Market,	the	UK	would	be	open	to	greater	regulatory	loosening,	backing	out	from	agreements	such	as	the
Renewable	Energy	Strategy	and	the	entitlement	to	20	days	paid	annual	leave	within	the	Working	Time	Directive.	The
cost	of	these	regulations	(identified	as	a	total	of	56)	is	assumed	to	be	0.9%.
‘Take	a	break’
Another	option	would	be	to	postpone	the	agreement,	although	in	view	of	the	forthcoming	European	elections	in	2019
that	might	further	complicate	the	negotiation	process.	On	the	one	hand,	the	end	of	the	Commission’s	mandate
suggests	the	existence	of	an	institutional	limit	in	terms	of	the	timeframe	for	the	negotiations.	On	the	other,	delaying
the	transition	period	might	enable	the	EU	to	design	a	tailor-made	agreement	that	might	also	serve	as	a	template	for
other	Member	States	in	a	future	multi-speed	EU.
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However,	though	this	scenario	might	gain	time	and	frame	future	relations	in	a	more	sustainable	way,	it	could	be
politically	explosive	for	Theresa	May.	Public	opinion	is	very	focused	on	the	key	question	of	“when	is	Brexit?”	and	less
keen	on	understanding	technocratic	reasons	as	justifications	for	another	delay.	May’s	position	is	exacerbated	by	the
need	to	keep	the	government	cohesive	by	promising	to	leave	the	Single	Market	and	the	Custom	Union	while
remaining	the	EU’s	‘best	friend’	in	a	still	highly	ambiguously	framed	partnership.	Any	concessions	to	the	EU	in
sensitive	domains,	such	as	migration,	would	surely	bring	a	major	rebellion	within	the	Conservative	party.
Although	opinion	polls	reveal	that	voters	have	not	really	changed	their	minds	since	the	referendum,	but	rather	have
formed	a	new	sense	of	identity		around	“Leavers”	and	“Remainers”,	public	opinion	is	nevertheless	swinging	towards
holding		another	vote	on	the	final	terms	of	the	agreement.	Indeed,	a	recent	Guardian/ICM	survey	found	a	quarter	of
those	who	voted	Leave	would	like	to	have	another	referendum	when	the	final	deal	is	on	the	table.	As	a	result,	and	for
all	these	reasons,	an	unstable	political	climate	could	further	foster	an	increased	sense	of	political	conflict	and	an
antagonistic	relationship	between	the	“us”	–	UK	–	and	“them”	–	the	European	Union.
Furthermore,	according	to	Michel	Barnier,	a	‘special’	deal	is	not	on	the	agenda,	meaning	the	UK	will	not	be	allowed
to	cherry-pick	the	most	beneficial	aspects	of	the	Single	Market.	Given	all	these	uncertainties,	it	is	easy	to	imagine	a
scenario	where	Brexit	seems	to	be	incomplete	for	an	extended	period	of	time,	and	becomes	still	more	confusing	for
an	increasingly	divided,	uncertain	and	concerned	public.	A	more	likely	scenario	might	be	that	rather	than	an	explicit
break,	we	see	a	protracted	set	of	negotiations	in	which	it	is	less	clear	when	and	how	Brexit	will	occur.
Brexit:	‘lost	in	transition’?
A	February	UK	position	paper	seemed	to	indicate	the	possibility	of	a	longer	transition	period	in	order	to	get	a	better
trade	deal.	But	that	would	depend	on	putting	the	European	Commission’s	basic	principles	into	practice,	with
decisions	on	several	critical	questions	–	such	as	the	budget,	EU	citizens’	rights	and,	above	all,	the	thorny	Irish
problem.	At	the	core	of	the	Irish	issue	is	the	impossibility	of	reconciling	three	demands:	(i)	no	border	between
Northern	Ireland	and	Ireland;	(ii)	no	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	UK	and	(iii)	the	UK	not	being	in	the	custom
union.	Put	simply,	as	long	as	the	UK	intends	to	leave	the	customs	union,	the	Irish	question	cannot	be	solved.	Indeed,
though	both	Barnier	and	the	Brexit	secretary	David	Davis	appear	to	agree	that	it	can	be	negotiated	at	a	later	stage,
they	seem	to	overlook	how	politically	explosive	it	is,	given	the	government’s	dependence	on	the	unionist	party	DUP
to	push	through	parliamentary	votes.	This	could	be	the	factor	that	brings	the	government	down.	Until	the	EU	and	the
UK	search	for	common	ground	on	how	to	reconcile	their	agendas,	a	‘lost	in	transition’	scenario	appears	the	most
likely.
This	post	represents	a	report	on	discussions,	and	does	not	represent	the	views	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Dr	Marina	Cino	Pagliarello	is	a	Research	Associate	at	LSE	Consulting.	She	holds	a	PhD	in	Political	Economy	from
the	European	Institute,	and	her	research	focuses	on	the	politics	of	education.
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